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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of Saturday, May 20, 2006, Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents raided the Capitol Hill office of Congressman William
Jefferson, searching for evidence in connection to a corruption
investigation.1
Several members of a court-ordered filter team
accompanied the agents for the purpose of sifting out potentially privileged
legislative material.2 During the search, which lasted through the night and
into the early afternoon hours of the next day, agents seized two boxes of
paper documents and several computer hard drives.3 The reason for the
relative secrecy and added layer of protocol, represented by the filter team,
was because an authorized search warrant had not been executed on a
Congressional office in the history of the United States.4 Outrage soon
followed.5
On one hand, the indignation following the FBI’s search seems
confusing; after all, the FBI met the basic requirement of probable cause
needed to obtain the warrant.6 Prior to the raid on his office, $90,000 in
cash had been found in Congressman Jefferson’s home freezer, wrapped in
1. Philip Shenon, FBI Searches Congressman’s Office in Ethics Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2006, at A22 (outlining the raid and discussing the underlying
accusations of money given to Congressman Jefferson in exchange for using his
influence to help a company, iGate, win government contracts).
2. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113, D.C. 20515,
432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter Rayburn] (delineating the filter
teams—one for paper documents and one for computer files—to be made up of FBI
agents not connected to the investigation or prosecution of Congressman Jefferson).
3. Id.; see Shenon, supra note 1, at A22 (indicating that at the time the article was
written on Sunday, May 21, 2006, FBI agents were still searching the office).
4. See Editorial, Searching the Congressman’s Office, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2006, at A26 (noting that the first search executed on a Congressional office in 217
years riled lawmakers in both parties, and concluding that the explosiveness of the
argument could be destructive to other on-going criminal investigations into
congressional actions).
5. See David Johnston & Carl Hulse, Gonzales Said He Would Quit in Raid
Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at A1 (discussing the fact that Attorney General
Gonzales and FBI Director Mueller both threatened resignation if the executive
returned the materials to Congressman Jefferson because the two men felt an obligation
to protect evidence in a criminal investigation); see also Carl Hulse & David Johnston,
House Leaders Demand Return of Seized Files, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at A1
(reporting that Republican and Democratic leaders of the House demanded the return of
the files seized in the search, that the search warrant be voided, and that the Justice
Department immediately halt its review of the documents in question). But see Gary
Langer, Poll: Americans Support Searches, ABC NEWS, June 1, 2006, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PollVault/story?id=2025343&page=1 (indicating that
eighty-six percent of Americans agreed that the FBI should be allowed to search a
Congress member’s office with a warrant).
6. Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 105-06 (discussing the government’s eighty-three
page affidavit in support of its application for a search warrant, and concluding that it
established probable cause to believe that evidence of the bribery crime would be found
in Congressman Jefferson’s office).
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aluminum foil and placed in frozen food containers.7 The FBI also had
knowledge about Congressman Jefferson’s overseas contacts, and believed
that he engaged in legislative acts for the express purpose of helping a
company win government contracts.8
On the other hand, the outrage over the execution of a search warrant on
Congressman Jefferson’s office went to the heart of a constitutional
provision that, according to Congressman Jefferson and his allies, should
have prevented a division of the executive branch from searching
legislative offices.9 At the hearing where Jefferson argued for the return of
property taken from his office, his main point emphasized that this
constitutional provision—known as the Speech or Debate Clause—
prohibits the executive from performing a search on a congressional
office.10 The reason, according to Jefferson, is that the history of
legislative privilege—formed in England hundreds of years ago, trailing
down through Supreme Court and District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals precedent to the present time—precludes exactly the sort of search
that occurred on the night of Saturday, May 20, 2006.11 Congressman
Jefferson lost.12
This Comment argues that where the executive has probable cause to
request a search warrant on legislative offices, the Speech or Debate Clause
does not act as a bar. Further, such searches can help restore trust in
Congress that is nearing all-time lows. This Comment agrees with the
Rayburn court’s ultimate conclusion allowing the execution of the search
warrant to occur, but strongly disagrees with the reasoning supplied by the
court.
7. See Philip Shenon, Documents Point to Bribes of Nigerian by Congressman,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006 at A18 (revealing that the FBI had found the money the
previous August, and that the money was allegedly to go to a middleman involved in
Congressman Jefferson’s bribery scheme).
8. See id. (detailing the alleged bribery scheme, whereby Congressman Jefferson
was to help a technology company win contracts with federal agencies and with
governments in Africa, in exchange for money).
9. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07 (outlining Congressman Jefferson’s
three-part argument, which raised concerns about: (1) the Speech or Debate Clause; (2)
separation of powers principles; and (3) the Fourth Amendment).
10. Id. at 108-11; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“The Senators and
Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace,
be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”).
11. Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 108-10.
12. See id. at 119 (denying Congressman Jefferson’s motion for the return of
property seized during the search of his office, and concluding that the Speech or
Debate Clause does not shield Members of Congress from the execution of valid search
warrants).
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Part II examines the history of legislative privilege, beginning in
seventeenth-century England. Part II also reviews Supreme Court and
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals precedent showing the
extent of the privilege that the Speech or Debate Clause provides. Part III
begins by arguing that the Rayburn court’s analysis of the Speech or
Debate Clause is flawed. Although the ultimate conclusion was correct—
that the search on Congressman Jefferson’s office was constitutional—
Chief Judge Hogan misconstrues Supreme Court and District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals precedent. Part IV of this Comment proposes a
hybrid approach to solving the tripartite concerns of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. This Comment concludes that the best
solution is to allow the judicial branch to authorize searches on
congressional offices when presented with probable cause, but only when
the search is conducted using, first, a filter team composed of nonexecutive branch members and, second, a neutral judicial arbiter as the
ultimate decision maker as to what constitutes privileged legislative
material.
BACKGROUND
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE IN ENGLAND
The Framers of the Constitution took the text of the Speech or Debate
Clause nearly verbatim from the Articles of Confederation.13 In turn, the
idea of legislative privilege can be traced to the English Bill of Rights of
1689.14 Turmoil reigned in England in the 1600s, with an on-going conflict
between the House of Commons and two lines of monarchs.15 These
monarchs “utilized criminal and civil laws to suppress and intimidate”
legislators in the House of Commons.16 Thus, the original understanding of
legislative privilege was to protect legislators from intimidation by the
executive.17
13. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966) (noting that the Speech or
Debate Clause was approved at the Constitutional Convention without debate or
opposition, and further explaining that the language of the Clause was taken from the
Articles of Confederation, with merely cosmetic changes made by the Convention’s
Committee on Style).
14. Id. at 177-78.
15. See Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the
Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1129-30 (1973) (citing the
“cataclysmic confrontation” between Parliament and the monarch as the driving force
behind the enactment of the English Bill of Rights and the formation of legislative
privilege in that country).
16. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178-79 (arguing that legislative privilege is the first line
of defense in the “protection of the independence and integrity of the legislature” from
prosecution by an unfriendly executive).
17. See id. (concluding that the formation of legislative privilege was the
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As noted above, the idea of legislative privilege from executive
meddling crossed the Atlantic nearly intact.18 James Madison argued that
the purpose of the privilege was to reinforce the key principle of separation
of powers between the three branches of government.19
II. FRAMING SPEECH OR DEBATE: SUPREME COURT AND DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PRECEDENT
Because the principles behind the Speech or Debate Clause were well
established in England and America, the Supreme Court had little occasion
to interpret and define the Clause, until a recent spate of cases in the 1960s
and ‘70s.20 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not initially interpret the Clause
until 1881.21 After that case had been decided, the Court went nearly one
hundred years before returning to the issue of legislative privilege under the
Clause.22 Finally, by deciding a number of cases in a short period of time,
the Supreme Court enunciated a clearer view of the purpose and limitations
of the Speech or Debate Clause.
The Supreme Court initially provided a broad interpretation of the
Speech or Debate Clause in Kilbourn v. Thompson.23 Thompson, SergeantAt-Arms for the House of Representatives, subpoenaed Kilbourn during an
culmination of a long struggle for legislative independence against a tyrannical
executive; the privilege acts as a shield against the resurgence of a dictatorial executive
branch).
18. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1120-21 (articulating that the
Speech or Debate Clause, more so than most constitutional provisions, “can be directly
traced to historical antecedents” out of England in the 1600s, while arguing that a static
interpretation of the Clause “leads to undesirable consequences”).
19. See Richard D. Batchelder, Jr., Chastain v. Sundquist: A Narrow Reading of the
Doctrine of Legislative Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 384, 387 (1990) (stating that
Madison believed that the purpose behind legislative privilege should guide judicial
interpretations).
20. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179 (attributing the short history of Supreme Court
cases on the issue of legislative privilege, and the lack of clear precedent, to the long
tradition and well-defined contours of the privilege in England and the United States).
21. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204-05 (1881) (limiting legislative
privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause to things generally done by a Member of
Congress in accordance with the purpose of the position, and noting that this includes
writings and speech which may occur outside the representative’s chamber).
22. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1114 (noting that Johnson,
decided in 1966, was only the fourth case addressing the Speech or Debate Clause to
reach the Supreme Court, and attributing the paucity of decisions to the well-defined
understanding of legislative privilege from England, which thereby made it less likely
that an appellate court would review legislative privilege cases).
23. See 103 U.S. at 204-05 (holding that an interpretation of the Clause that was
too narrow in construction—limited to spoken words in debate—would not make sense
given the wide-ranging official duties of Members of Congress); see also Batchelder,
supra note 19, at 388 (discussing how the Kilbourn Court adopted a liberal
construction of the privilege, beyond the actual wording of the Clause, which allows
the privilege during debate).
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investigation into a bankrupt company.24 Though Kilbourn appeared, he
refused to answer any questions and did not tender the requested
documents.25 Thompson subsequently took Kilbourn into custody; when
he was released, Kilbourn sued Members of Congress for false
imprisonment.26 The Court concluded that, although Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority, its members were privileged from suit for activities
within the scope of regular congressional activity.27
In 1966, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the Speech or Debate Clause in
United States v. Johnson.28 In an effort to exert influence over an ongoing
investigation into a Maryland savings and loan institution, Congressman
Johnson read a speech on the House floor.29 In holding that the Clause did
protect Members of Congress from prosecution under such circumstances,
the Court held the testimonial privilege of the Clause to be absolute.30 The
Court further held that inquiry into the motivations behind a legislative act
by a Member of Congress is precisely what the Speech or Debate Clause is
supposed to foreclose from executive and judicial inquiry.31
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court had occasion to review and further
interpret the Speech or Debate Clause when three cases arose in quick
succession.32 Gravel v. United States involved a U.S. Senator who read
aloud classified documents to a Senate subcommittee before placing those

24. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 193-96 (questioning why Congress involved
themselves in the bankruptcy proceedings when the matter was still working its way
through the judicial system).
25. See id.
26. See id. (concluding that Congress’ resolution authorizing Kilbourn’s
imprisonment was beyond the scope of congressional powers conferred by the
Constitution).
27. Id. at 204 (holding that the Clause also applies to written reports, resolutions,
and acts of voting, i.e., “things generally done” by Congress).
28. See 383 U.S. 169, 171 (1966) (holding that, even where a Member of Congress
abuses his position by accepting bribes for giving a speech, such conduct is privileged
because the Speech or Debate Clause forecloses inquiry into the motivations behind
official congressional conduct).
29. See id. at 171-72 (outlining the conspiracy whereby two Congressmen would
attempt to influence the Department of Justice to have the indictment dismissed in
exchange for “campaign contributions” and “legal fees” that were, allegedly, bribes).
30. See id. at 185-86 (affirming the Fourth Circuit’s reversal of the Congressman’s
conviction, after adducing that evidence in the case had been obtained in violation of
the Speech or Debate Clause when the prosecutor specifically asked Congressman
Johnson questions about the speech he gave on the House floor).
31. Id. at 180.
32. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1114 (noting the increase in
Supreme Court cases directly dealing with the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1960s
and ‘70s, after Members of Congress began invoking it as protection against intrusion
into official congressional actions).
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documents on the public record.33 A grand jury investigating whether
violations of federal law occurred subpoenaed an aide to the Senator.34 The
Court held that the Speech or Debate Clause applied even to legislative
aides, but further determined that the Clause did not extend protection to
the public realm, because publication of confidential documents did not fall
within the legislative sphere.35
The Supreme Court decided a companion case to Gravel on the same
day.36 The defendant in United States v. Brewster, a former Senator, was
indicted for accepting bribes in exchange for being influenced in position
and voting stance regarding postal rate legislation.37 The Supreme Court
held that the district court improperly dismissed the indictment against the
Senator because his actions were not privileged within the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity.38
A year later, the Supreme Court decided another case dealing with the
limits of legislative privilege in Doe v. McMillan.39 The Supreme Court
held that congressional committee members were absolutely immune from
suit under the Speech or Debate Clause insofar as they engaged in

33. See 408 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1972) (discussing how Senator Gravel released the
Pentagon Papers to the public despite the fact that they were classified Defense
Department documents concerning the United States’ decision-making and policy in
Vietnam).
34. See id. at 609 (noting that a grand jury subpoenaed Senator Gravel’s assistant
because the assistant had helped him in preparing for the subcommittee meeting and
placing top-secret papers into the public record).
35. See id. at 628-29 (including Senator Gravel’s motivations, conduct, and
comments at the subcommittee meeting as privileged within the “sphere of legitimate
legislative actions,” while allowing Senator Gravel’s aide to be questioned by a grand
jury concerning the source of the classified documents).
36. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1118 (noting the similar central
question in Gravel and Brewster, of what falls within the purview of legitimate
legislative activity protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, and the similar
conclusion of the Court—that activity falling within the legislative sphere is protected).
37. 408 U.S. 501, 502 (1972).
38. See id. at 526 (distinguishing the acceptance of bribes by Senator Brewster—an
illegal act not within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity—and Brewster’s
actions post-acceptance of the bribe, including the influence of his position on the
legislation in question). So long as the motivations behind the speech or vote were not
questioned, Brewster could be tried on the underlying bribery charge. Id. See also
United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (asserting that the
remedy for violating Speech or Debate protections is for a court to prohibit the
government from presenting privileged material upon objection by the defense).
39. See 412 U.S. 306, 307-10 (1973) (discussing the factual background of the
case, wherein parents brought suit on behalf of their D.C. public schoolchildren
alleging violation of privacy rights because a Senate subcommittee report used the
names of children who were failing out of school); see also Reinstein & Silverglate,
supra note 15, at 1119 (discussing McMillan’s procedural history—noting that it
reached the Supreme Court just after Gravel and Brewster and acts as the third leg in
modern legislative privilege jurisprudence).
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legitimate legislative activities such as preparing subcommittee reports.40
McMillan is important because it reaffirms the holding in Gravel—that the
absolute privilege of the Speech or Debate Clause extends to actions within
the sphere of legislative activity.41
Ten years after deciding Johnson, the Supreme Court considered the
difference between testimony and subpoena in Andresen v. Maryland.42
The Andresen case involved an authorized search of defendant’s business
premises, where investigators uncovered evidence of the crime of false
pretenses, and used the information obtained during the search to help
convict the defendant.43 On appeal, the issue of whether the Fifth
Amendment prevented the use of the incriminating papers against the
defendant was raised.44 In determining that the Fifth Amendment did not
provide such protection in this case, the Court reasoned that the defendant
had not been forced to say or do anything.45
Chief Judge Hogan’s analysis in Rayburn also included three D.C.
Circuit cases.46 In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371 involved
a subpoena issued to an administrative assistant to Congressman Richard
Kelly.47 The district court, persuaded by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, required Representative Kelly to present to the court material he
considered privileged under the Speech or Debate Clause.48 In deciding
40. See McMillan, 412 U.S. at 317-18 (determining that Members of Congress are
absolutely immune from suit for the creation of the documents themselves, as this
involved legislative activities such as: (1) conducting hearings, (2) preparing the report,
and (3) authorizing its publication). The Court further determined that the publication
of the document in itself is outside the sphere of legislative activity. Id.
41. Id. at 324.
42. See 427 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1976) (articulating that the historic function of the
privilege provided by the Fifth Amendment was to protect an individual against selfincrimination through compulsory testimony).
43. See id. at 469 (indicating that the defendant had been involved with a real estate
transaction and had been indicted for fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary in
connection with the deal).
44. Id. at 472.
45. See id. at 473 (indicating that the records seized during the search contained
statements that the defendant had voluntarily committed to writing, and that the
requisite compulsory element necessary to successfully invoke Fifth Amendment
protections was absent in this case).
46. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 111-15 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing three
cases—two from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and one from the D.C. District
Court—dealing with the scope of the privileges provided by the Speech or Debate
Clause).
47. See 491 F. Supp. 211, 212 (D.D.C. 1980) (listing what the aide had to bring
with him to the Grand Jury hearing, including: (1) Representative Kelly’s appointment
diary and daily schedule; (2) travel records; (3) guest sign-in book; and (4) files relating
to a trip to Israel).
48. See id. at 213 (concurring with the requirement in In re Grand Jury
Investigation into Possible Violations of U.S.C. § 201, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978) of
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that the Clause did not protect the confidentiality of the material, the court
reasoned that testimony by Congressman Kelly could not be used against
him in criminal or civil proceedings, and thus there was no need to protect
the confidentiality of the material itself.49
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered the limits of legislative
privilege in MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., which
involved a group of defendants that served subpoenas on a congressional
subcommittee requiring disclosure of certain information and documents in
its possession.50 The appeals court affirmed the decision of the district
court to quash the subpoena, and reasoned that the critical inquiry when
determining the extent of the privilege that the Speech or Debate Clause
provides is whether the action at issue—even an illegal action—was
undertaken within the legitimate “legislative sphere.”51 Importantly, the
court expressed concern over the broad subpoena requested by defendants
by noting that the effect would be akin to a “fishing expedition into
congressional files.”52
More recently, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to
reanalyze the Speech or Debate Clause with respect to legitimate legislative
activities in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams.53 The case
involved subpoenas issued to two Congressmen at the request of a tobacco

in camera review of documents that the Congressman indicated were protected by the
Speech or Debate Clause).
49. Id. at 214. Other cases and commentators, however, have found an implicit
guarantee of confidentiality in legislative material and other privileged arenas. See,
e.g., United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 840-41 (D.D.C. 1997) (asserting that the
government bears the burden of showing that filter team procedures used during the
search of a law office sufficiently guarded against intragovernmental communication);
United States v. Ehrlichman, 389 F. Supp. 95, 97-98 (D.D.C. 1974) (stating that
disclosure of transcripts of legislative deliberations were barred under the Speech or
Debate privileges because deliberations fall within the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity); Note, Evidentiary Implications of the Speech or Debate Clause, 88 YALE
L.J. 1280, 1286 n.30 (1979) (contending that the privilege provides that confidentiality
itself is a legitimate legislative interest that should be protected).
50. 844 F.2d 856, 857-58 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing how defendants sought to
show that the wording of sworn statements had allegedly been changed by the staff
director of a congressional subcommittee, ostensibly to protect the legality of
transactions conducted in the silver market in the 1970s).
51. See id. at 860-61 (following Supreme Court precedent in McMillan and Gravel
that, though such acts may be reprehensible, even illegal acts may be protected under
the umbrella of legislative privilege).
52. Id. at 862-63 (finding the authorization of such subpoenas inconsistent with the
Speech or Debate Clause specifically, and separation of powers principles more
generally, because it would destroy the comity between the three branches of
government, while also running contrary to Supreme Court precedent).
53. 62 F.3d 408, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (concluding that the “questionable
provenance” of the documents used by the congressional subcommittee did not mean
that the subcommittee could not make appropriate use of them).
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company during the tobacco hearings and litigation of the 1990s.54 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to quash the subpoena
after determining that the Speech or Debate Clause prevented compelling a
Member of Congress from testifying or producing documents.55
Chief Judge Hogan, relying on the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals cases discussed above, interpreted the Speech or Debate
Clause as providing Members of Congress two distinct privileges.56 The
Clause, according to the Rayburn court, is read broadly to include
“anything generally done” in a session of Congress, including voting,
committee reports, hearings, and legislation itself.57 The Rayburn court
subdivided this privilege into a testimonial privilege, held to be absolute,
and a catch-all category of other actions within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity.58
ANALYSIS
I. FRITTERING AWAY THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE: MISINTERPRETING
THE PURPOSE OF THE PRIVILEGE
A. The Testimonial Privilege: Absolute, But Inapplicable in Congressman
Jefferson’s Case
The Rayburn court correctly determined that the testimonial privilege of
the Speech or Debate Clause is absolute under certain circumstances.59
Congressman Jefferson argued that the search of his congressional office
unconstitutionally violated his legislative privilege under the Speech or
Debate Clause.60 Jefferson relied on Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,61 arguing that its precedent required the return of the material taken
54. Id. at 411-12.
55. See id. at 421 (asserting that documents that come into the hands of Members

of Congress may only be reached by a direct suit or subpoena if the circumstances by
which the Members of Congress obtained the documents were themselves illegal, thus
falling outside the sphere of legitimate legislative acts).
56. Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 109-10 (D.D.C. 2006).
57. Id. at 109; see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1973) (reasoning that
these types of conduct, originally delineated in Kilbourn, are privileged under the
Clause because they fall within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity).
58. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 111-13 (dismissing Congressman Jefferson’s
bipartite argument that both the testimonial privilege and the legitimate legislative
activities privilege apply in this case, and holding that the search warrant executed on
his office did not conflict with legislative privilege).
59. Id. at 111 (concluding that the testimonial privilege that the Speech or Debate
Clause provides is absolute because the Clause protects Members of Congress from
being questioned about the motivations behind their legislative actions).
60. Id. at 108, 112.
61. Id. at 111; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d
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from his office.62
Chief Judge Hogan correctly rejected Jefferson’s argument.63 Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. reaffirms the Speech or Debate Clause’s
testimonial privilege.64
When subpoenas were issued against two
Congressmen requiring them to testify concerning how a package of stolen
documents had ended up in Congress’ hands, the district court quashed the
subpoena because it involved testimony concerning legislative acts.65 The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Congressmen could not be
made to answer the subpoena because doing so would necessarily involve
testimony about the legislative process in general and about the specific
elements of legislative acts that Congress was considering.66
The Rayburn court’s rebuttal to Jefferson’s use of Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. as controlling precedent was that the instant motion and the
previous case were discussing two different situations.67 United States v.
Johnson explored the testimonial privilege that the Speech or Debate
Clause provides to Congress.68 The search warrant authorized by Chief
Judge Hogan in Rayburn, however, did not concern testimony.69 This
408, 415-16, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (determining that the Speech or Debate Clause
confers on Members of Congress immunity from lawsuits even though their conduct, if
performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be contrary to criminal or
civil statutes).
62. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) (providing for a mechanism whereby a
person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property may move for the
property’s return, so long as the court receives necessary factual evidence concerning
the illegality of the search).
63. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (determining that Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. did not control Jefferson’s motion because it addressed civil subpoenas
while the issue here concerned the execution of a search warrant in a criminal case).
64. See id. at 111 (distinguishing the instant action on the grounds that the
execution of a valid search warrant does not bring testimonial privileges into play).
65. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 62 F.3d at 412 n.2 (asserting that the
district court did not follow precedent when it held that the passive receipt of material
from outside parties did not constitute a legislative act entitled to protection under the
Speech or Debate Clause).
66. Id. at 416-17.
67. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (arguing that, because Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. said nothing about the availability of documents pursuant to
a valid search warrant in a criminal investigation, Congressman Jefferson’s attempt to
use the case as controlling precedent necessarily fails).
68. See 383 U.S. 169, 173 (1966) (proscribing the evidence taken in a trial against
a former Congressman, where the prosecutor questioned him about specific sentences
in a speech he had given, because the Speech or Debate Clause prevents inquiry into
the motivation behind why a Member of Congress engaged in particular legislative
activities).
69. Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 111; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 51-52 (2004) (defining “testimony” as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,” a definition that excludes
evidence seized during an authorized search warrant).
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distinction between subpoenas and search warrants is important. For
example, a subpoena against Jefferson requiring him to testify about certain
aspects of a law he drafted would fall into the testimony privilege that the
Speech or Debate Clause provides.70 But, a search warrant requires no
testimony.71 Indeed, Representative Jefferson was not even present at the
time of the execution of the search warrant on his office.72 As Chief Judge
Hogan surmised, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.’s holding
considered only civil subpoenas, not documents obtained pursuant to a
search warrant in a criminal investigation, and therefore the case did not
form controlling precedent.73 Because Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. does not form controlling precedent, the Rayburn court’s conclusion
that the testimonial privilege is inapplicable here is correct.
Supreme Court precedent in Andresen v. Maryland, drawing a distinction
between the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incriminating
testimony and an authorized search of a person’s business documents that
reveals incriminating writings, supports the key difference between search
warrants and subpoenas outlined by Chief Judge Hogan.74 The Court’s
focus on whether such testimony was compelled is the key to its
reasoning.75 For example, in Andresen the petitioner had not been
compelled to say or to do anything—the statements seized during a lawful
search had been voluntarily committed to writing.76 Moreover, an expert,
not the defendant, authenticated those notes at trial.77 The Supreme Court
concluded that the Fifth Amendment provides protection for the party

70. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 173-76 (discussing the problem infecting the
prosecution of a Member of Congress when the prosecutor questioned the
Congressman’s manner and motives for giving a certain speech on the floor of the
House, because such examination runs against the testimonial privilege of the Speech
or Debate Clause).
71. Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
72. See id. (asserting that Congressman Jefferson could not successfully claim the
testimonial privilege because he was not on site during the execution of the search
warrant, meaning he could not have been compelled to say or do anything during its
administration).
73. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 412 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (discussing how the tobacco company obtained a court-order requiring
Congressmen Waxman and Wyden to attend a deposition and to produce documents
related to the investigation, and concluding that such an order went against the
testimonial privilege provided for by the Speech or Debate Clause).
74. See 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976) (holding that the search of petitioner’s office for
business records and the subsequent introduction of those records into evidence did not
offend the Fifth Amendment, which only protects against compelled self-incrimination,
because the records had been written down voluntarily).
75. See id. at 475.
76. See id. at 473.
77. See id. at 472.
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producing the evidence, not for the evidence itself.78
In comparison, Congressman Jefferson had not been made to say or do
anything.79 By arguing that the testimonial privilege of the Speech or
Debate Clause protects documents seized from his congressional office,
Congressman Jefferson argued for an extension of the privilege not
supported by precedent.80
This distinction between testimony and the fruits of a legal search
formed the lynchpin of Chief Judge Hogan’s analysis of why the
testimonial privilege that the Speech or Debate Clause provides is
inapplicable in Congressman Jefferson’s case.81 Congressman Jefferson
had not been made to answer or testify concerning the findings of the
search team, meaning that the Rayburn court correctly determined that the
testimonial privilege of the Speech or Debate Clause was inapplicable.82
B. The Speech or Debate Clause Privileges “Legitimate” Legislative
Materials: Nothing is More Legitimate than the Office Files of a Member
of Congress
In addition to the testimonial privilege, there is a second prong of
privilege that the Speech or Debate Clause provides. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals explored the limits of this second prong in MINPECO,
S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.83 This case makes clear that the
78. See Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913); see also Trinity Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 156-57 (N.D. 1996) (concluding that the
difference between privilege and confidentiality is that privilege addresses a person’s
right not to testify, while confidentiality addresses the obligation not to disclose
information except as part of judicial proceedings).
79. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 112 (D.D.C. 2006) (reasoning that the
documents seized during the execution of the search warrant on Congressman
Jefferson’s office cannot be construed as compelled testimony because, unlike a
subpoena, no action was required on Congressman Jefferson’s part).
80. See id. (dismissing Congressman Jefferson’s argument that the Speech or
Debate Clause’s testimonial privilege was applicable to the execution of search
warrants in a criminal investigation because the purpose of the Clause is not to promote
secrecy in legislative actions; rather, the purpose of the Clause is to protect the
independence of the legislative branch by not compelling testimony from Members of
Congress for their legitimate legislative activities).
81. See id. at 111 (comparing evidence produced in response to a subpoena, which
triggers Fifth Amendment protections, with the authorization of a search warrant,
which does not trigger Fifth Amendment protections because of the lack of compelled
testimony).
82. See id. at 112 (dismissing Congressman Jefferson’s initial argument concerning
the testimonial privilege, and moving on to consider the “legitimate legislative
activities” privilege provided by the Speech or Debate Clause).
83. See 844 F.2d 856, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (determining that the critical inquiry in
Speech or Debate Clause analysis is whether the action falls within the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity; if it does, the action is privileged, and if not, the matter is
not privileged).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007

13

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3

162

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:1

second touchstone of the Speech or Debate Clause privilege is immunity
from liability for legitimate legislative acts.84 Chief Judge Hogan’s
analysis on this point is conclusory, reasoning that because the material did
not fall within the legitimate legislative sphere this second privilege did not
apply in Congressman Jefferson’s case.85 However, it is undisputed that
the FBI removed legislative documents from Jefferson’s office.86 If the
purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to protect the legislature87 from
“fishing expeditions”88 into legislative materials by an aggressive
executive, a better system needs to be in place to provide for the
protections of the Clause. Instead, Chief Judge Hogan argues that there is a
difference between legislative material incidentally captured during the
execution of a judicially authorized search warrant and an unauthorized
search by a hostile executive branch into legitimate legislative activities.89
This represents a misreading of Supreme Court precedent, as one of the
primary reasons in support of legislative immunity is the potential abuse by
a “hostile judiciary.”90 It does not matter that the judiciary may not
84. See Matthew R. Walker, Constitutional Law—Narrowing the Scope of Speech
or Debate Clause Immunity—United States v. McDade, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 377, 386-87
(1995) (discussing the Supreme Court’s progressive narrowing of what constitutes
legislative acts by using Johnson’s holding as an example, and noting that the
protection provided by the Speech or Debate Clause only applies in criminal charges,
and the Clause protects legislators only in those cases involving close scrutiny of the
Member of Congress’ actions).
85. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (arguing that, unlike the facts in Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., according to the affidavit filed with the court in support of
its application for a search warrant, the material the FBI sought in the instant case did
not include legislative material).
86. See id. at 106 (noting that FBI agents ultimately seized copies of the hard
drives of the office’s computers, as well as boxes of paper records, during the execution
of the search warrant).
87. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966) (articulating the view
that the overarching purpose of the Clause is the “protect[ion] against possible
prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary”); see also
Michael R. Seghetti, Note, Speech or Debate Immunity: Preserving Legislative
Independence While Cutting Costs of Congressional Immunity, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 589, 590-91 (1985) (discussing the underlying purpose of the Clause, and
arguing that the original reason for the Clause’s inclusion in the Constitution was to
provide safeguards to protect the independence of each branch of government).
88. MINPECO, 844 F.2d at 862-63.
89. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (arguing that Congress’ capacity to
function is not threatened by permitting congressional offices to be searched pursuant
to validly issued search warrants, because of the prophylactic requirement of prior
approval by a neutral judicial arbiter).
90. See Seghetti, supra note 88, at 590-91 (articulating the view that the Speech or
Debate Clause is an important safeguard, which protects the legislative branch as a
whole, allowing representatives to perform their lawmaking duties without fear of
reprisal); see also Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1147-48 (arguing that
judicial decisions restricting legislative privilege at the behest of the executive have
later been regretted as unfortunate instances of judicial overreaction).
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actually be hostile to the interests of the legislative branch.91 As discussed
below, the Supreme Court has held that the central point of the Clause is to
assure co-equal branches of government freedom of speech without
intimidation or threat.92
The original understanding of legitimate legislative acts included actions
generally performed by a Member of Congress.93 Despite the presence of a
filter team, the possibility that the executive might have captured legitimate
legislative matter in the search remains a concern.94 In fact, the Supreme
Court tangentially touched on this concern in Johnson, when it held that the
Speech or Debate Clause protected a Congressman who had accepted
bribes to give a specific speech. Although this is a form of testimonial
privilege absolutely protected under the Clause, it is also an exception to
the legitimate legislative acts privilege.95
The difference between
Congressman Johnson’s actions and Congressman Jefferson’s alleged
crime is that one involved a bribe given in exchange for a favorable speech
and the other involved a bribe for helping to win contracts for a company.96
In either case the argument can be made that no privilege should be
granted, if it is to be true that legislators ought not stand above the law they
create.97 Or, an argument can be fashioned that the important jobs done by
Congressmen necessitate immunity and privilege for “speech or debate” as
that term has come to be interpreted.98 Arguing that because Congressman
Johnson’s crime was to give a speech in exchange for money—presumably
91. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (noting that federal judges are
independent, neutral, and sworn to uphold the Constitution, meaning that, in theory,
judges should not favor the executive over the legislative branch).
92. See Gravel v. United States, 418 U.S. 606, 616 (1972).
93. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881); see also Katherine Deming
Brodie, The Scope of Legislative Immunity Under the Speech or Debate Clause and the
Rulemaking Clause, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1117, 1120 (1996) (arguing that immunity
for legislative acts is absolute, but that “legislative acts” is a relatively narrow category
and excludes “political acts” outside the scope of the Clause’s privilege).
94. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 105-06 (discussing the composition and role of
the filter team made up of FBI agents not connected to the investigation or prosecution
of Congressman Jefferson, supposedly to assuage concerns about executive
intimidation of the legislature).
95. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (distinguishing the
acceptance of bribes by the Senator—an illegal act not within the purview of privileged
legitimate legislative activity—and the Senator’s actions post-acceptance of the bribe,
including influencing his position on the legislation in question). As long as the
motivations behind the legislative action were not questioned, the Senator could be
tried on the underlying bribery charge. Id.
96. See Shenon, supra note 1, at A22.
97. See Gravel v. United States, 418 U.S. 606, 615-18 (1972) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson’s sentiment that lawmakers, like ordinary citizens, are bound by the laws they
create, while still allowing for legislative privilege to facilitate governance).
98. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1179.
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not the sort of activity in which Congressmen should be engaged—excuses
his actions as a necessary compromise in providing an important privilege
to members of the legislature.99 Congressman Johnson’s alleged crime is
no more legitimate than Congressman Jefferson’s; either the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause should be narrowed considerably, back to its
original understanding of protecting legislators from libel and slander
charges,100 or expanded considerably to include protection of privileged
legislative documents from the prying eyes of the executive and judicial
branches.101
Splitting the difference, however, can work. The best solution to this
problem is to hybridize the approach taken by Chief Judge Hogan with the
approach taken by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. This is essentially
what Chief Judge Hogan was attempting to do with his imposition of a
filter team during the execution of the search warrant.102 Refine Chief
Judge Hogan’s approach, and add to it in camera review of allegedly
privileged legislative material, and splitting the difference becomes the best
possible solution.
C. Lack of Confidentiality of Legislative Material Does Not Preclude
“Incidental Review”
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in In
re: Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371 that the Speech or Debate
Clause does not protect confidentiality of legislative material.103 This is an
important point, because it provides a neat remedy—exclusion of the
privileged documents—in cases where the executive searches or seizes
99. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 (asserting that, however reprehensible
Congressman Johnson’s actions were, the Clause protects him from inquiry into the
motivations for giving a speech on the House floor).
100. See JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (VOL. 1) 421
(Robert Green McCloskey ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1967)
(asserting that the importance of legislative privilege—and its original purpose—was to
enable and encourage a representative to enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, without
fear of resentment or retribution).
101. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1179 (expressing the view that
the Clause’s protections should be expanded to include: (1) speeches; (2) debates; (3)
conduct in committee; (4) receipt of information used in proceedings; (5) publications
and speeches made outside of Congress; and (6) even the decision-making processes
behind each of these).
102. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2006) (suggesting that the
purpose of the filter team was to assuage legislative privilege concerns by examining
seized documents and listing them for a court to review at a later time).
103. See 491 F. Supp. 211, 214 n.2 (D.D.C. 1980) (arguing that because the material
is not confidential there is little reason to exclude it from the executive, considering the
fact that such material remains privileged and therefore a prosecutor cannot use it
against the Member of Congress).
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privileged legislative material.104
The Rayburn court argued in Congressman Jefferson’s case that material
incidentally captured during a search did not constitute an unlawful
intrusion under the Speech or Debate Clause.105 The conclusion and
remedy, according to the court, is to merely exclude the use of the
privileged material.106 The basis for this argument is that the power to
determine the scope of one’s own privilege should not be available to
anyone.107 The court, however, misunderstands Jefferson’s argument;
rather than being able to pull out evidence from the legislative material,
Jefferson’s point is that the material itself is privileged.108 Unlike in United
States v. Rostenkowski109 or in Johnson, where the D.C. Circuit and
Supreme Court, respectively, determined that eliminating references to
protected material solved the problem,110 in the instant case the problem is
the underlying search itself.111 If the purpose of the search is to uncover
legislative material, what is left for the Speech or Debate Clause to protect
once all reference to legislative material is excised?112
104. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966) (allowing the
government to proceed with a new trial against Congressman Johnson, so long as
evidence offensive to the privileges of the Speech or Debate Clause were excised).
105. 432 F. Supp. 2d at 114 (asserting that the Speech or Debate Clause is not
undermined by the incidental review of privileged material, given that even if the
executive seized legislative material during the search no privileged material may ever
be used against Congressman Jefferson in court; in other words, actions and materials
within the legislative sphere are privileged, not the confidentiality of those documents
and words).
106. Id. at 114 n.8.
107. See id. at 115 (noting that even the President of the United States—using
former President Nixon as an example—does not have the power to determine the
scope of his own privileges, because it is the province of the judicial branch to interpret
the law).
108. See id. at 110.
109. 59 F.3d 1291, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
110. See id. (placing the burden on the Member of Congress to prove that the
government relied on privileged material before the district court has the power to
excise the material); see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966)
(precluding the use of privileged legislative material, but allowing the government to
move forward with a new trial once the suspect evidence had been excluded). Applied
to Congressman Jefferson’s case, such a result would arguably leave nothing for the
FBI to proceed with, since the material seized constituted legislative material itself.
See id.
111. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 114 (dismissing Congressman Jefferson’s
argument that the executive’s viewing of legislative documents during the search
rendered it unconstitutional, because even if the documents are privileged as legitimate
legislative material, they are nonetheless not confidential).
112. See, e.g., Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1157-58 (discussing the
problem of “The Bribed Congressman,” i.e., what happens in cases where the crime
involved is actually a speech given by a Member of Congress in exchange for a bribe,
and concluding that the Speech or Debate Clause needs to be construed broadly, less
bribery statutes be selectively used against Members of Congress who lack rapport with
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In Johnson, the Supreme Court determined that the case against
Congressman Johnson could proceed once the Speech or Debate material
had been excised, leaving the evidence of financial transactions with other
conspirators and with the Department of Justice.113 The nature of the
conspiracy allowed such evidence to exist; in contrast, the evidence that the
FBI sought against Congressman Jefferson involved looking at and seizing
legislative files.114 The Supreme Court in Johnson held that certain
evidence was inadmissible as a breach of the Speech or Debate privilege.115
This included statements given by Congressman Johnson to the prosecutor
of the case, concerning the motivation behind giving a speech for
compensation.116 Unlike in Johnson, where once the offending material
had been excised117 the Supreme Court allowed the case to go forward,
there is no ability to excise offending material in the present case.118
The inherent difference between seizing legislative materials as the basis
for a corruption probe, as in this case, and seizing financial transaction
records, as in Congressman Johnson’s case, is that the former flies in the
face of the protections provided by the Speech or Debate Clause, while the
latter does not involve the legislative process at all.119 As the Supreme
Court held in Brewster, the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect
against an illegal action in and of itself.120 Rather, the illegal actions are
the White House).
113. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172.
114. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
115. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 176-77, 180.
116. See id. at 185.
117. See id. at 173-76 & n.5 (detailing the exchanges between the prosecutor and
Congressman Johnson concerning the motivations, manner of preparation, and
ingredients of a speech that Johnson gave on the House floor).
118. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106, 110 (detailing that, in the instant case,
filter team agents kept logs of potentially privileged documents for final review by a
court, but allowed no mechanism for Congressman Jefferson to challenge the
determination of the agents and court as to what constituted legislative material).
119. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179-80 (interpreting Supreme Court precedent to
mean that the Speech or Debate Clause provides protection for only those acts
generally done in a session of the House, and concluding that a conspiracy to defraud
the United States did not fit into this category). But see Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at
110 (disagreeing with Congressman Jefferson’s argument that because members of the
executive branch necessarily reviewed and seized legislative material during the
execution of the search warrant, the search itself was unconstitutional, because, carried
to its logical conclusion, this argument would require advance warning to Members of
Congress who are the targets of the search warrants to allow them to remove what they
deem to be protected legislative material, thereby precluding removal of potentially
significant material to a legitimate investigation).
120. See 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (distinguishing the acceptance of bribes by
Senator Brewster from the influence it had on his position, and asserting that the bribe
was a crime for which the Senator could be tried, while the motivation behind his
change in official position was irrelevant to proving the crime).
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prosecutable.121 But, when the executive begins questioning the motives
behind the legislative actions of a Member of Congress—even if those
motives were illegally induced—the Speech or Debate Clause protects the
Member of Congress.122 Once the offending legislative material in Johnson
had been excised, the remaining evidence did not involve legislative
material at all.123 On the other hand, where, as here, the evidence against
Congressman Jefferson is the legislative material itself—in the form of
paper documents and computer files—the Speech or Debate Clause is
supposed to provide protections that Chief Judge Hogan overlooks.124
D. Separation of Powers Principles: Best Served When the Executive Does
Not Have Unbridled Access to Legislative Material
Congressman Jefferson frames his Speech or Debate argument within a
more general argument concerning separation of powers.125 Congressman
Jefferson’s main point is that the executive disrupts the careful system of
checks and balances when it gains judicial authorization to search an office
of a member of the legislative branch.126 Indeed, the Supreme Court came
to a similar conclusion in Brewster when it discussed the potential for
harassment of the legislature by an unscrupulous executive.127 Rather than
addressing this concern, however, Chief Judge Hogan relies on the
argument that, by placing the judiciary as a neutral arbiter between the
executive and legislature, the likelihood of abuse is lessened.128 How
121. See id. (stressing that, so long as the motivations behind the speech or vote are
not questioned, which would be protected by the testimonial privilege of the Speech or
Debate Clause, Senator Brewster could be tried on the bribery charge).
122. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 (asserting that where a Member of Congress’
actions are reprehensible, the essence of legislative privilege forecloses inquiry by the
executive and judicial branches, because the separation of powers argument outweighs
the executive’s interest in prosecution).
123. See id. at 185 (allowing the case against Congressman Johnson, for conspiring
to defraud the United States, to go forward on evidence not connected to the
motivations the Congressman had for giving a speech).
124. See id. at 180-81.
125. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 116-17 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Seghetti,
supra note 88, at 590 (stating that the underlying purpose of legislative immunity is to
assure separation of powers among the three branches of government).
126. Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
127. See 408 U.S. 501, 523 (1972) (asserting that attempts by one branch of
government to establish dominance over another branch have met with little success,
due in part to public sentiment to the contrary).
128. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (arguing that the threat to separation of
powers principles comes not from one co-equal branch executing a search warrant over
another, after the independent authorization by the third co-equal branch, but by the
position argued by Congressman Jefferson that the Members of Congress within the
legislative branch enjoy unilateral and unreviewable power to invoke an absolute
privilege).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007

19

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3

168

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:1

neutral an arbiter the judiciary is when granting search warrants, however,
shows that this analysis is flawed because oftentimes the judiciary is a
rubber stamp on the desires of the executive.129
In some respects, the Rayburn decision comports with a new
interpretation of separation principles.130 By giving cursory analysis to the
issue, and concluding that the search of Congressman Jefferson’s office did
not violate the separation of powers principle, Rayburn stays out of the way
of an inter-branch dispute. 131
E. Analogizing Law Office Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Concerns
About Searching Privileged Areas
Chief Judge Hogan’s analysis correctly dismissed Congressman
Jefferson’s argument that the search of his office without the presence of
counsel was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.132 However,
Chief Judge Hogan’s cursory analysis of another Fourth Amendment
concern raises further questions.133 While Chief Judge Hogan cites United
States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc.134 to support his argument that
searches of areas in which privileged material is expected to be found are
129. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 34 & n.63 (1988) (likening magistrate
approval of search warrants to rubber stamping of executive desires, given the
oftentimes lax protocol employed by magistrates, including judge shopping and
perfunctory review). But see Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (“A federal judge is not
a mere rubber stamp in the warrant process, but rather an independent and neutral
official. . . .”).
130. See Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward A Unifying Theory of the
Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 36-42 (2003) (articulating in favor of a
new interpretation of separation of powers principles, whereby the judiciary takes an
active role only infrequently, and that court rulings ought to be delayed and restrained
when considering inter-branch disputes).
131. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 116-17 (dismissing as a “gross trivialization”
Congressman Jefferson’s separation of powers argument that intervention by the
judiciary merely provides a rubber stamp on the executive’s unfettered desire to obtain
search warrants of congressional offices).
132. See id. at 117 (holding that Congressman Jefferson’s argument that the barring
of his counsel from his office during the search violated FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2) and
rendered the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment fails because the plain
language of the rule “clearly contemplates that the owner [of the property that is subject
to a search warrant does] need not be present” at the time of the execution of the
warrant and that the rule says nothing about the property owner’s counsel).
133. See id. at 118 n.12 (discussing examples of valid searches of areas where
privileged material is expected to be found, including attorneys’ offices, and
determining that the cases have not held this to be unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment so long as certain procedures were followed to ensure protection of the
attorney-client privilege).
134. 211 F.R.D. 31, 43 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding that a search of an attorney’s
computer, believed to contain privileged attorney-client materials, was reasonable
where a filter team was in place to screen for privileged material and where a neutral
magistrate had ultimate authority to approve documents turned over to the prosecution).
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not unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, there is an
important exception.
Law office searches offer a parallel interpretation to the search of a
congressional office; the searches are analogous because both entail
explorations where information that is specially privileged beyond the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment may be improperly divulged.135 As such,
jurisprudence regarding searches of law firm documents provides a relevant
starting point to determine how congressional documents may be properly
searched pursuant to a criminal investigation.136 In the case of law offices,
the general rule is that if the lawyer is accused of wrongdoing, and his
office is searched, the fact that some of his files contain privileged
attorney-client material does not act as a bar to conducting the search.137
Likewise, Chief Judge Hogan correctly argues that a search of a
congressional office when a Member of Congress is accused of
wrongdoing—which almost assuredly contains legitimate legislative
material protected by the Speech or Debate Clause—is not barred merely
because the privileged material may be seen.138 United States v. Neill
offers another parallel in the use of a filter team and ultimate review by a
magistrate judge before any document is turned over to the prosecution to
ensure that protected materials were not included.139
Upholding the spirit of these analogous precedents, Chief Judge Hogan’s
conclusion—that the execution of the search warrant on a congressional
office was constitutional, despite the proximity of privileged material—is

135. See Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 961 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding that the warrant to search the law firm’s files, and the subsequent seizure of
files, was overly broad because the government made no attempt to exclude files
containing attorney-client information that were unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims).
But see Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (allowing the search and seizure of legislative
documents because the procedure and limits of the warrant sought to prevent disclosure
of privileged materials and was sufficiently narrow).
136. See, e.g., John E. Davis, Note, Law Office Searches: The Assault on
Confidentiality and the Adversary System, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1251, 1273 (1996)
(comparing searches of law offices to searches of congressional offices and proposing
the imposition of a neutral arbiter to determine whether private records of an attorney
are privileged within the scope of the attorney-client relationship).
137. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (holding that when there is a compelling
need to conduct a search in relation to an investigation involving serious crimes, an
invasion of privilege greater than usual may be allowed if evidence cannot be obtained
through any other reasonable means).
138. See id. at 114-18 (holding the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
assuming that privileged material is not necessarily guaranteed to be kept confidential,
if the Member of Congress is immune from civil or criminal liability).
139. See 952 F. Supp. 834, 840-41 (D.D.C. 1997) (expressing reservations, for
“obvious reasons,” about the use of filter teams in seizing privileged material from a
lawyer’s office, and instead favoring review by a neutral and detached magistrate, or by
a court-appointed special master).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007

21

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3

170

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:1

appropriate.140 The FBI had probable cause to request a warrant,141 and the
presence of a filter team designed to prevent privileged legislative material
from falling into the hands of the executive partially allays the interest of
third-parties.142 Thus, unlike law office searches, the primary concern of
the breach of a third-party privilege is not present.143
IV. A COMPROMISE? USING IN CAMERA REVIEW TO PROTECT PRIVILEGED
MATERIAL WHILE STILL ALLOWING FOR AUTHORIZED SEARCHES
The arguments and reasoning adopted by Chief Judge Hogan in Rayburn
did not consider the possibility of in camera review of supposed legislative
material.144 However, on appeal the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that Chief Judge Hogan must conduct an in camera review, in
the presence of Congressman Jefferson, of documents the FBI seized.145 In
camera review of potentially privileged legislative material has been used
in the past as a necessary protection to materials privileged by the Speech
or Debate Clause.146 In the instant case, Congressman Jefferson will
highlight sections and documents that he feels are privileged as legitimate
legislative acts, and Chief Judge Hogan will then determine whether the
documents are, in fact, privileged.147 If the documents are indeed
privileged, they are to be excluded from the evidence against Congressman
140. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
141. See Shenon, supra note 7, at A18 (discussing allegations pointing to corruption

of Congressman Jefferson, including his plan to bribe Nigerian officials with $500,000
in cash, in exchange for their help in winning business in West Africa).
142. Rayburn, 432 F. Supp 2d at 106 (indicating that the purpose of the filter team
was to log which documents were potentially privileged, and provide the log to the
Court for a final determination of privilege, before turning non-privileged documents
over to the prosecutor).
143. See Davis, supra note 138, at 1254 (indicating that the effect of a broken
privilege is a shift in power to the executive, because the executive branch enforces the
law and therefore decides whom to prosecute).
144. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 115-16 (discussing the possibility of in camera
review by the judicial branch in theory, but ultimately deeming such review
unnecessary in the instant case because the prior judicial determination to grant the
search warrant, as well as the formation of the filter team, provided protection to
Congressman Jefferson’s interests).
145. Philip Shenon, Lawmaker Wins Delay on Review of Evidence, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2006, at A10.
146. See, e.g., In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F. Supp. 211,
213-14 (D.D.C. 1980) (agreeing with the Third Circuit’s holding in In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978), requiring in camera review of documents
an accused congressman indicated were privileged legislative material as a necessary
protection that the Speech or Debate Clause grants to Members of Congress).
147. See, e.g., Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 n.2 (D. Md. 1983)
(detailing the in camera procedure, which requires an index of potentially privileged
documents, as well as the documents themselves, to be submitted for judicial review, to
ensure that the defendants characterized their content accurately).
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Jefferson; if the documents are not privileged, the FBI and prosecutor will
gain access to them.148 Because the Speech or Debate Clause does not
provide for the confidentiality of legitimate legislative materials, this poses
no problem, at least facially.149
The in camera review requirement imposed by the Court of Appeals is
similar to the original requirement of having a filter team present during the
search. Under either regime the purpose is to prevent privileged material
from falling into the hands of the executive.150 However, there are
important differences. First, the Speech or Debate Clause is supposed to
protect against an overzealous executive handling and viewing such
material.151 Nonetheless in this case, two Department of Justice attorneys
and an FBI agent, albeit with no role in the investigation or prosecution of
Congressman Jefferson, were chosen for the filter team.152 While these
individuals had no connection to the instant case, they were all members of
the executive branch.153 Likewise, the computer file filter team was
composed of FBI computer examiners, also executive branch members,
who had no role in the investigation or prosecution of the case.154 One of
the primary motivations behind the Speech or Debate Clause is to shield
the legislature from an executive that may wish to interfere in the
legislative process.155
Concerns that the executive will improperly view or use privileged
material can be assuaged by inserting a neutral member of the judiciary
into the role of arbiter to determine what constitutes privileged material.156
148. Shenon, supra note 147, at A10.
149. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 110, 114 (arguing that, because the Speech or

Debate Clause does not provide confidentiality to privileged material, an intrusion is
lawful when such material is incidentally captured during the execution of a valid
search warrant).
150. See id. at 105-06, 108-15 (asserting that the special search procedures used
during the execution of the search warrant minimized the likelihood of legitimate
legislative materials falling into the hands of the executive, and concluding that these
procedures satisfied the requirements of the Speech or Debate Clause).
151. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966); see also Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 15, at 1161 (suggesting that an unfriendly executive could
selectively apply bribery statutes against Members of Congress whose rapport with the
White House may be less than ideal).
152. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (suggesting that because the agents were
not directly involved in the investigation or prosecution of Congressman Jefferson, the
likelihood of inter-branch conflict was lessened).
153. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1304 (2004) (arguing in favor of legislative oversight of the FBI,
because it is a very powerful arm of the executive branch with a history of abuse).
154. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
155. Seghetti, supra note 88, at 589-91.
156. Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 115-16. But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606, 618 (1972) (noting that the Court, when interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause,
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As Chief Judge Hogan notes, having an experienced, knowledgeable
judiciary decide where and when to authorize search warrants preserves the
legislative privilege shield.157 Oftentimes, however, the judiciary does act
as a rubber stamp on the executive’s desire to obtain a search warrant.158
One way to alleviate the concern of having executive branch members
giving the final determination of what is and is not privileged legislative
material is to reinsert the judiciary as the final arbiter. Much like in United
States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., where the judiciary’s role was to
screen for material that fell into the classification of attorney-client
privilege, the judiciary should play a similar role in searches of
congressional offices.159
The compromise offered by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is the
most reasonable because it best assures that the judiciary serves as the
arbiter of what materials the executive may view without violating the
privilege of the Speech or Debate Clause. While implicitly affirming Chief
Judge Hogan’s conclusion that search warrants could be executed on
congressional offices, the D.C. Circuit re-imposed a neutral judiciary into
the role of final arbiter on whether any of the documents seized from
Congressman Jefferson’s office fell into the legitimate legislative material
privilege provided by the Speech or Debate Clause.160
CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that no search warrant had been executed on a
congressional office in over two hundred years, Chief Judge Hogan
has sought to implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from
executive and judicial oversight that threatens to influence a Member of Congress’
actions).
157. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (expressing distaste at Congressman
Jefferson’s argument that the judiciary acts as a rubber stamp to executive controls, and
noting that federal judges are sworn to uphold the Constitution—presumably meaning
that separation of powers concerns are already provided for through the authorization
of the search warrant in the first place).
158. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 131, at 34 (arguing that the “rubber
stamping” of warrants by magistrates is an “open scandal” because of the perfunctory
review conducted by magistrates); Stephen Labaton, Before the Explosion, Officials
Saw Little Risk for Building in Oklahoma City, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1995, at A19
(concluding that judges are largely rubber stamps for the executive, after conducting a
review of authorization of wiretaps by federal and state judges, and finding that only
seven applications out of 8,950 since 1983 have been turned down).
159. See 211 F.R.D. 31, 43 (D. Conn. 2002) (discussing role of the judiciary in
approving and authorizing procedures to create a taint team to set up a wall between the
evidence and the prosecution).
160. See Shenon, supra note 147, at A10 (discussing the procedure set up by the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals requiring Chief Judge Hogan to conduct in camera
review of any documents that Congressman Jefferson indicates are privileged
legislative material).
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correctly authorized a search of Congressman Jefferson’s office. While the
Rayburn court correctly interpreted and applied aspects of the testimonial
privilege provided for in the Speech or Debate Clause, it failed to properly
consider the ramifications of allowing the executive unbridled access to
legitimate legislative material—exactly the type of protection that the
Supreme Court has held the Speech or Debate Clause provides.161
Legislative government only works if Congress is held accountable, and,
while it is arguably a political question that should be addressed through
the election cycle,162 “legislators ought not to stand above the law they
create but ought generally to be bound by it as are ordinary persons.”163
With probable cause, the offices of Congress should be subject to searches,
so long as certain protections are taken to ensure compliance with the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. These protections should be
a combination of a filter team, designed to screen out legitimate legislative
material, and a reinsertion of the judiciary as the final arbiter of what
constitutes legitimate legislative material.164 However, unlike the filter
team in the instant case, future teams should be composed of non-executive
branch members. Only if the executive is not involved in the actual
screening process of legitimate legislative material can legislative privilege
fully be protected.
At a time when Americans view Congress with increasing credulity,165
and with major scandals already destroying political careers166 or hanging
over the heads of politicians,167 one way of helping restore trust in
161. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 324 (1973).
162. See Brodie, supra note 94, at 1120 (arguing Speech or Debate Clause privileges

exclude “political acts” outside the scope of legitimate legislative activity).
163. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972).
164. See Rayburn, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106-07, 115-17 (D.D.C. 2006) (suggesting
that the judicially-created “filter team” regime, followed by judicial review of
documents that the filter team thinks fall within the purview of legislative privilege,
rebuts Congressman Jefferson’s argument that the search violated his constitutional
rights).
165. See Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Most Americans Displeased
With Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/09/20/us/politics/21pollcnd.html (reporting that congressional approval
ratings are at their lowest point since 1994, with only twenty-five percent of Americans
polled approving of the job Congress was doing).
166. See, e.g., David Stout, DeLay Rules Out Campaign For His Former House
Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A12 (discussing why former House Majority Leader
Tom DeLay would not seek reelection in 2006, citing his indictment on campaign
finance violations and his involvement in the Jack Abramoff scandal as contributing
factors to his decision).
167. See, e.g., Kate Zernike & Abby Goodnough, Lawmaker Quits Over E-Mail Sent
to Teenage Pages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at A1 (discussing the scandal
surrounding former Congressman Mark Foley after sexually charged emails between
him and underage congressional pages came to light).
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government is to allow search warrants to be executed on congressional
offices. By holding Members of Congress accountable for their actions,
while giving special search protection for legitimate legislative actions,
trust in elected government can be restored.
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